CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Our demand is simple: apply free trade rules not on ly to those products that are of interest to the rich and powerful, but also to those products where poor countries have a proven comparative advantage.
AMADOU TOUMANI TOURE AND BLAISE COMPAORE,

presidents of Mali and Burkina Faso, respectively
In a July 2003 op-ed in the New York Cf'imes titled ''Your Farm Subsidies Are Strangling Us," Toure and Compaore made cotton the poster child for dem onstrating how negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) failed to address "development." They charged that the hypocritical trade poli cies of the United States and European Union contributed to the poverty faced by thousands of small farmers in West Africa. At the same time, they pointed to a broader crisis: the legitimacy of global rules that privileged Western firms and states was quickly unraveling.
These West African leaders were not alone in posing this challenge. Bra zil had filed a complaint against US cotton subsidies through the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body in 2002. With this challenge, Brazil made a simi lar charge: if the United States and its powerful corporate allies wanted the rest of the world to abide by its rule-governed system of "free" trade, the rules would have to apply to everyone. In the eyes of many, the Brazil-US dispute would be a test of the legitimacy of the WTO.
The WTO was launched in 1995 to create binding rules to establish a lib eralized trading environment on the global stage. Leaders of Western coun tries and international organizations insisted that a liberalized economy was in the best interests of the entire global community. The promise to countries in the global South was not just that neoliberal policies would in crease trade, but that, in the words of WTO Director-General Renato Rug giero, "most important of all, by opening their economies these countries accelerate their development'' (1998).
These promises, however, soon proved empty. As Toure and Compaore attest, the trade policies of the United States and the European Union have been deeply h yp ocritical. They have aggressively pursued liberalization in services such as bankin g, insurance, and telecommunications-sectors in which the North holds a clear competitive advantage-while continuing to protect their agricultural sectors where the global South could make gains. While WTO rules compel African cotton producers to compete in markets dominated by powerful Western corporations and to privatize their state trading enterprises, the United States has continued to pour billions of dollars into subsidies for their cotton growers and exporters. Rather than deliver development, this asymmetrical application of trade rules has de pressed global market prices for Southern export crops like cotton and al lowed the United States to dump its cheap farm commodities on liberalized markets in the South. The deep conflict over US cotton subsidies loomed large at the annual meetings of the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC) that I at tended in September 2005. This conflict had been at the heart of the collapse of WTO negotiations in Cancun in 2003. Now, the ICAC, an international commodity organization, was meetingjust months before further wro ne gotiations in Hong Kong. Sitting in a session on government policy, I saw the Cancun stalemate reproduce itself before my ey es. Delegations from Brazil and the "Cotton-4" countries of West Africa (Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, and Chad) pointed to US subsidies as "a blatant injustice" and called on the ICAC to issue a formal statement demanding their rapid elimination. The US delegation brushed off these charges, insisting that the ICAC ''was not a negotiating body'' and that th ey could not support such statements.
While the US delegation wanted to avoid movement on the subsidy issue, they appeared to have a different priority for the ICAC meetings: to move toward an agreement on a single set of cotton quality standards, and a com mon instrument for measuring fiber quality, that would replace the existing mismatch of national standards and smooth global trade. The US Depart· ment of Agriculture (USDA) had been working with cotton fiber scientists in Germany to demonstrate that the standards and measurement system used in the United States could be extended on a global scale and still supply the reliable measurements demanded by the transnational merchants that dominated the trade.
Resistance to the US proposal to extend their standards and measure ment system on a global stage was unambi gu ous. Officials from various African countries repeatedly raised concerns that the capital-intensive mea surement instrument used in the United States was not appropriate. for countries in the global South. "Isn't there a moral duty to reduce the costs of implementing the system?" appealed a representative from Mozambique. Other delegations from the global South accused the USDA standards of be ing biased toward US cotton. Fiber scientists tried to cast quality standards as technical and apolitical rules that merely served to reduce the transaction costs of trade. However, for firms and states from the global South, it ap peared that even if subsidies were eliminated and a so-called "unregulated" market was achieved, these new rules would still stack the deck against the global South.
A few da ys later, however, I discovered that it was not the challenge from ICAC delegates that most concerned the US government delegation and the cotton producers, textile manufacturers, and merchants that it represented. One afternoon I found myself sitting amongst an audience of cotton mer chants-the most powerful actors in the cotton trade-at the parallel con ference held by the merchant-dominated association, the International Cot ton Association (ICA). For merchants, the ICAC was a forum to influence states and national policies. The ICA conference, on the other hand, was about packing in business meetings with clients from around the world and schmoozing over drinks in the hotel lobby. Few people actually attended the conference presentations.
But on this particular afternoon, the presentation hall was crowded for a talk by a representative from China. Since the early 2000s, China had become a textile and apparel powerhouse. Importing close to 40 percent of all transnationally traded cotton, it had acquired both significant sway in the cotton market and the listening ears of the merchant community. A k ey issue in the presentation was quality inspection for cotton imported into China. The representative from a quasi-private Chinese trade association, the China Cotton Association, ran through a host of problems that the gov ernment quality inspection office had found with recent imports, including seeds in cotton from Africa and rat excrement in cotton packing from the United States. As she continued down her list, a low grumbling could be heard from the crowd. Transnational merchants were looking for a piece of the Chinese pie, but this meant negotiating with the Chinese govern ment and Chinese firms over trade rules -in this case, how cotton quality, and thus price, would be verified when cotton was imported into China. When the presentation was over, merchants jockeyed to ask questions but became unsettled by the Chinese representative's vague responses. Finally, a merchant from one of the largest cotton trading companies in the world jumped to his feet, and audibly frustrated, questioned the Chinese represen-ment officials and experts have repeatedly enunciated a strategy that views st andards as trade weapons," explains political scientist Scott Kennedy In this book, I chart a new course for understanding how the rules of the game are made and remade in the global arena. Many attempts to map change in governance institutions emphasize the high degree of uncertainty and hybridity that characterizes institutional transformations in the current era. A rigid world of interstate treaties has been replaced by fluid inter actions within more amorphous and diverse "transnational communities" or "webs of influence" (Djelic and Quack 2010; Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). New forms of"experimentalist'' governance are emerging as actors try to respond flexibly to a shifting terrain (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010 ). It seems that the foundations of economic governance are "disaggregating" beneath our feet (see Slaughter 2004). These are not shock-like transformations in institutions but rather incremental changes that are nonetheless transform ing the rules of the game.
These accounts provide valuable descriptions of how institutional ar rangements are changing. What they lack is a robust explanation of why institutions change. We are instructed to expect incremental movements toward "something entirely new, unexpected, unanticipated and emer gent'' (Djelic and Quack 2003a:9). However, we are not given the tools to understand why such incremental yet transformational changes should be expected or why certain emergent outcomes might be more likely than others. The future trajectory of institutional change is indeed uncertain and the stakes are high. As diverse actors-from firms and government agen cies to lawyers, scientists, and agricultural producers-struggle over what rules will prevail, profits are made and lost, jobs move from one country to another, and economic superpowers are born or wither away. It is thus imperative that we garner the theoretical tools to make sense of this uncer tainty and chart the range of future possibilities.
The crux of my argument is this: hegemonic rivalries shape strategies to change institutions. As coalitions of powerful firms and states create insti tutions to expand the scale and scope of the global economy, they unleash new competitive d yn amics that both give rise to new rivals that seek to take control of these institutions and generate marginalized actors that seek to challenge their destructive effects. Periods of uncertainty over whose rules will prevail in the global economy are thus the result of the patterns of con flict generated by projects of market liberalization. Just as the hegemonic coalition led by the British state and firms faced ch allenges to its free trade imperialism in the early decades of the twentieth century, so too is the he gemonic coalition led by the US state and transnational firms facing chal lenges to its own free market project in the early decades of the twenty-first century.
Actors' positions within these broader conflicts over the organization of the global capitalist system shape their preferences, bargaining power, and thus strategies in institutional struggles. This conflict-driven process of in stitutional change is inevitably incremental in nature. New rivals remain dependent on the existing arrangements that stimulated their own rise to power, yet seek to redirect these institutions to privilege their own interests over those of already dominant actors. This was the situation faced by the US state as it sought to take control of the institutions governing the cotton trade in the early 1900s and is now the predicament of the Chinese state as it faces US-dominated institutions. These rivals must first imitate existing institutional arrangements before th ey can overtake them.
The institutions that result from these conflict-driven processes are also inevitably hybrid as dominant actors are compelled to reconstitute their own rules to protect their institutional privileges. Facing growing chal-lenges from both new rivals and marginalized actors, dominant actors do not simply cling to existing rules. Instead, dominant actors reconstruct the rules to at once appease their challengers and protect their institutional privileges. Just as Britain sought to retool its institutions governing the cot ton trade to stave off challenges from both rivals and marginalized actors within the United States, the US state and transnational merchants recon figured their existing arrangements in the contemporary era to appease ri vals in China and marginalized actors in the global South. The new, hybrid institutions that emerge from these d yn amic interactions reflect and instan tiate the broader geoeconomic and geopolitical transitions among rivaling hegemonic coalitions.
Forwarding this argument, I develop a theory of institutional change within the global capitalist system. In doing so, I intervene in the ongoing debates about globalization and institutional change in two ways. The in stitutionalist literature has emerged as a prominent approach to studying institutional change in the global arena. Institutionalist scholars have at tempted to map "transnational governance in the makin g, " an approach that captures the complex d yn amics among a wide diversity of actors op erating within and across national and supranational governance arrange ments (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006:2). These scholars offer com pelling accounts of how institutions change and how new institutions are forged through trial-and-error processes of experimentation and innovation within the constraints of existing institutions and shared cultural frames. I build on these accounts by grounding them in a theory of conflict. I see struggles over institutions and institutional change as emerging out of the concr ete class relations and material and ideological circumstances charac terizing the actually-existing global capitalist system. I demonstrate how ex perimentation and innovation in rule-making processes must be embedded within an analysis of historically specific institutional and systemic power relations. In short, institutionalist accounts tell us how transnational rules are made. But it is only a theory of institutional change within the global capitalist system that can tell us why certain actors can redirect the rules of the game to serve their interests and why other actors accept or reject these rules. The lineages of this type of approach can be traced to scholars in the Regulatio n School, the neo-Polanyian tradition, and the world-systems ap proach, among others (e. This scholarship often emphasizes the rise of transnational firms that can largely set the rules of the game as a defining characteristic of global economic integration (e.g., Robinson 2003; Sklair 2001). In doing so, scholars tend to focus on a singular axis of struggle between a global elite -a transnational capitalist class and its state allies-and the marginalized actors and social movements who may challenge dominant firms and institutions. Yet these accounts give little attention to the growing geoeconomic and geopolitical uncertainty in the global economy. The rise of the so-called "emerging economies" in China and India is recasting the terrain of struggle in new and complex ways that cannot be mapped by focusing solely on powerful Western firms and their state allies or even on the struggle between global elites and social movements. Rather, as I will demonstrate, the struggle over transnational rules of the game is at once a struggle among global elites and social movements, among powerful Western firms and emerging rivals in countries like China and India, and among states in a competition to trans· form their roles and activities to influence transnational governance. It is by understanding the dynamic interplay across these different axes of struggle within the historical development of the global capitalist system that we can make sense of institutional change in periods of hegemonic rivalry.
THE LIMITS OF INSTITUTIONALISM
How do existing institutions change and how are new institutions and rules constructed in the transnational arena? This question has become a central problematic in institutionalist approaches to globalization. Indeed, recent scholarship has refocused the analysis on institutional change, rather than persistence and reproduction, and on the strategic role of actors in creating change. These scholars have identified key mechanisms that illuminate how change occurs. Yet, they are limited in their ability to explain why institu· tions change and why they change as they do.
The limitations of institutionalist accounts of change are rooted in their treatment of power. Alford and Friedland (1985) suggest that power oper ates at three levels: the situational level, the institutional level, and the sys temic level.
1 The exercise of power at the situational level represents con testation over the "plays of the game." That is, actors struggle over direct power relations, or over their relative ability to command obedience from other actors. At the institutional level, contestation focuses on the "rules of the game."
2 Actors vie to influence institutional design such that their interests become reflected in rules for how the institution will operate, set agendas, and make decisions. Finally, contestation at the systemic level means a struggle over the game itself. For example, the Cold War could be characterized as a struggle over the game, as the United States and the USSR competed over what game or system -capitalism or communism -should be played. Institutionalist scholars focusing on change lack a robust theory of conflict as th ey focus on situational and institutional power, largely to the exclusion of systemic power.
A k ey contribution of change-oriented variants of institutionalism has been to move b ey ond a focus on institutional reproduction and persistence. Historical institutionalists have tended to see institutions as highly durable given that actors develop interests and strategies that serve to reinforce ex isting arrangements (e.g., varieties of capitalism approach of Hall and Sos kice 2001). This approach emphasizes the path-dependencies that limit the likelihood of changes that will fundamentally transform social relations. In short, by refocusing attention on strategic action, these scholars demon strate that, while the rules of the game shape the plays of the game, at the same time, the plays of the game can infl uence the rules of the game.
The problem is that institutionalists focusing on change give little at tention to the nature of the game itself, or the power relations defined by the system itself-in this case, the global capitalist system. This limits the explanatory power of their accounts. While these scholars recognize that resistance to existing rules can generate change, th ey are largely unable to explain why actors resist the rules to begin with. This is not to say that insti tutionalists do not account for conflict. To the contrary, many accounts see conflict as endemic to institutions. But, by i gn oring systemic power, they lack a theory of what the conflict is about.
4 Th ey assume actors' resistance to formal rules rather than providing a theory of conflict that would explain actors' resistance, as well as their strategies to direct institutional change.
Some scholars focused on institutional change do attempt to theorize conflict. However, their theories largely take the form of typologies that leave the systemic roots of power and conflict unspecified. For example, Halliday and Carruthers (2009) study the transnational harmonization of bankruptcy laws. These prominent sociologists of law see "global" and "lo cal" actors clashing over the harmonization of governance arrangem ents. S They argue that the conflict is shaped by two dimensions of power: the bal ance of power between the national and global; and the cultural and social "distance" between global and local actors. The "distance" between actors, they suggest, indicates ''how far apart the two sides of the interaction are at the outset'' (2009:22) . The greater the distance in terms of institutional pref· erences, the greater the likelihood of conflict. The balance of power ''helps to determine which side is more likely to be moving toward the other" in the process of negotiating (2009:22-23) .
But, one might ask, what is the source of the "distance" between "global" and "local" actors' institutional preferences and how might that shape the circumstances under which one side would move toward the other? Is this "distance" simply due to the lack of interaction, thus requiring time for actors to come to common understandings? Or is it the kind of social and cultural distance that emerges from a specific history of unequal relations that breeds distance in institutional preferences as well as resistance and mistrust (e.g., Roberts and Parks 2007)? Halliday and Carruthers offer us a typology of actors and their potential orientations but, as Burawoy might put it, provide no ''basis or source for particular patterns of conflict'' (Bura woy 1979:9).
The lack of attention to systemic power further limits the ability of insti tutionalists to explain why changing institutions ultimately take the form that they do. These scholars emphasize the potential for highly novel institu tional arrangements to emerge in the global arena. In doing so, they critique cultural institutionalists, such as world society scholars, who see organiza tions worldwide converging onto similar institutional forms through a pro cess of mimetic isomorphism (e. Part of the problem is that institutionalist approaches tend to theorize history rather than historicize theory in their approach to institutional change. 6 Theorizing history is the common approach to modern social sci ence. From this view, the problem to be explained is cast in general terms: how do institutions change? The answers are transhistorical: institutions change through the interplay of cultural frames, institutional path depen dencies, and strategic action. In short, institutionalists provide a theory of the general properties of institutions that is considered applicable across space and time. In accounts at this level of abstraction, the underlying causes of institutional change remain a mystery. Wolfgang Streeck argues that what institutional analyses "failed (and in fact never intended) to do was to account for the historical emergence and the pervasiveness of the sort of change that it had been developed to capture-its location in time and space as well as its direction and driving forces" (2011:139). Streeck (2009, 2010, 2011) has recently sought to embed his earlier institutionalist analyses (e.g., Streeck and Thelen 200,) within a theory of capitalism.
In short, institutionalist approaches to transnational governance have generated a rich conceptual vocabul ary for understanding institutional change and institution-building. But they are divorced from the specificities of the socioeconomic orders that construct and are constructed by these in stitutions. That is, institutions are abstracted from the global capitalist sys tem. If our goal is to understand why institutional change occurs and why new institutional arrangements take the form that th ey do, "these are ques tions a framework that takes capitalism for granted cannot even pose, let alone answer" (Burawoy 1979:12). What is needed is a historicized theory of institutional change as it is constituted by and constitutive of a socially and spatially specific economic system.
EMBEDDING INSTITUTIONS IN THE GLOBAL CAPITALIST SYSTEM
A theory of institutional change in the global capitalist system focuses on un derstanding why the rules of the game change and what form those changes take. Institutional power cannot be understood in isolation from situational and systemic power. Rather, these levels of power must be understood as necessarily intertwined and in dynamic interplay. Struggles over the rules of the game will be influenced both by the plays of the game and the game itself. The rules of the game can change as actors challenge or circumvent them through their strategies in the plays of the game. Moreover, the nature of the game itself-in this case, global capitalism-and broader struggles over how it should be organized shape the range of possible institutional rules and achievable goals (Wright 1994:93). In short, struggles over the rules of the game must be understood as embedded within material and discursive contestation at all three levels.
This requires theorizing the specificities of institutions within the global capitalist system. Institutions emerge and change in relation to the particu lar dynamics of global capitalist development-that is, institutions and the economy are mutually constituting spheres of activity, neither of which can function without the other (Block 1994; Block and Evans 200,). This per spective runs counter to institutionalist scholarship (Streeck 2009) but also to orthodox economics and neo-Marxist accounts that i gn ore the role of in-stitutions in the construction of capitalism. Rather than seeing the capital ist economy as expanding according to an internal and independent logic, capitalism must be understood as a "constructed system" (Block 2002:223). The global economy is made and remade through political struggle over the institutions that shape capitalist relations and the distribution of the ben efits and costs of capital accumulation. From this perspective, we can un derstand capitalism as an expansionary system but also emphasize that, as a product of political struggle, the potential trajectories of capitalist develop ment are diverse. As such, understanding institutional change is critical as it is tantamount to understanding the development of capitalism.
This approach has the potential to ground the abstract conceptualiza tions of institutional change offered by recent variants of institutionalism. Institutions must be understood not in abstract form but as constructed to facilitate certain configurations of capitalism. As Karl Polanyi (1957 [1944] ) suggests, the historical trajectory of capitalism as an institutionalized social order can be understood as unfolding through successive political projects in which powerful firms and states attempt to extend capitalist market re lations in ways that serve their perceived interests in market liberalism. On a global stage, hegemonic coalitions of states and firms have histori cally pursued liberal market projects to expand capitalist markets across space and to capture the benefits of this expanded trade (see Arrighi 1994; Silver and Arrighi 2003). Just as the hegemonic coalition led by the British state and firms sought to secure their geoeconomic dominance over poten tial rivals in the United States and Europe, the contemporary neoliberal co alition led by the US state and transnational firms has sought to capture the benefi ts of expanded global trade for themselves over competitors in China. In order to pursue these projects, firms construct-and compel states to construct-a constellation of governance institutions that facilitate and en force privatization, commoditization, and market liberalization on an ever more extensive scale. Rules that foster market expansion, such as quality standards, can be understood as embedded within such broader projects of market liberalism.
This conceptualization of institutions runs counter to historical institu tionalist accounts that see institutional design as a product of historical con tingency and serendipitous events (see Mahoney 2000). While institutions are historically specific and contingent, they are also intentionally planned. This does not mean that a single institutional entrepreneur or small group of actors can just willfully construct an institution in order to secure their prefere nces. Institutions are always the product of political struggle and comp romise. Moreover, intentionally constructing an institution does not mean that the rule-makers must fully understand the problems to be solved at the outset (or at any time during the rule-making process), nor that they accurately identify the solution that would best achieve their preferences. Institutionalists are correct in suggesting that rule-makers construct institu tions through processes of experimentation. However, seeing institutions as desi gn ed within the global capitalist system means that actors' perceived interests in institutional design, and their ability to pursue these interests successfully, are structured by their position within the competitive dynam ics of capitalism. In short, projects of market expansion are often lopsided, scattered, and pieced together in a trial-and-error way as actors seek to solve the problems they face given their position within historically and spatially specific processes of capital accumulation.
Liberal market projects are both material and discursive in nature. Ac tors construct discursive legitimations in particular contexts and with the aini to inform, steer, and legitimate particular projects of liberal market development. Drawing on the work of Edward Said (1978), Ngai-Ling Sum (2000) demonstrates how particular historical configurations of capitalism are constructed through processes of"otherin g, " or the discursive construc tion of certain people, places, practices, and governance arrangements as fair, just, or superior, while constructing the rest as "others," that is, people and practices that are unfair, inferior, or even dangerous. (1976 [1942] ) have emphasized, the extension of market disci pline has both creative effects, which stimulate technological and organi zational change and provide new opportunities for some actors to improve their competitive position, and destructive effects, which undermine com petitive positions and livelihood strategies. As actors' competitive positions and relative bargaining power shift, these creative and destructive dynamics generate distinct types of conflict.
The creative dynamics of liberal market institutions generate conflict by giving rise to new rivals capable of challenging the institutional privileges of dominant actors. Market-facilitating institutions intensify interfirm compe tition. In doing so, they set off a creative process that stimulates technologi cal and organizational innovation. Firms seek to create new technologies and products, design new strategies to minimize costs and control workers, and attain new economies of scale and speed to ensure their survival. In David Harvey's words, ''The struggle to maintain profitability sends capi talists racing off to explore all kinds of other possibilities" (1995:106). In this competitive process, it is not necessarily already-dominant firms who win out. To the contrary, the unintended outcome of the creative moment of liberal market projects is often the emergence of challengers who rival the economic power of previously dominant firms as competition drives the consolidation of capital. In short, liberal market projects generate new rivals that enjoy increasing bargaining power vis-a-vis dominant actors. These new rival firms can use their enhanced bargaining power to circwn vent or challenge existing rules.
The second axis of conflict emerges out of the destructive dy na mics of liberal market institutions. Political projects to extend market relations across the globe seek to secure the rights of capital over labor and other marginalized actors. Firms use political power to protect rights to private property at the expense of the rights of workers and other marginalid groups. As Gill puts it, the central goal of market liberalization is to "subject the majority of the population to the power of market forces whilst pr eserv· ing social protection for the strong'' (1994:407). By privileging the pursuit of profit over societal well-being and sustainability, liberal market institu· tions threaten established ways of making a living. As Karl Polanyi (1957 Polanyi ( [1944 ) has argued, the destructive dynamics of deepening market relations generate social conflict, which can make the enforcement of liberal market institutions difficult. That is, these actors marginalized by liberal market projects are compelled to defend "established and widely accepted social compacts on the right to livelihood-in other words, [they are] in part fu eled by a sense of 'injustice'" (Silver 2003:18) .
This argument follows Polanyi's claim that liberal market projects gen· erate social conflict and spur countermovements for societal protecti on. However, I argue that distinct types of "push-backs" against liberal marke t projects often derive from different axes of conflict and thus are more di· verse than Polanyi suggests and can take competitive rather than protecti ve forms. In essence, a more complex terrain of struggle must be mapped in order to understand the trajectory of institutional change. To do this, I draw on both nee-Marxist and especially world-systems analyses of systemic chaos during periods of hegemonic rivalries (e.g., Arrighi 1994; Arrighi and Silver 1999; Wallerstein 1974).
STRATEGIES FOR CONTESTING LIBERAL MARKET INSTITUTIONS
By identifying the underlying causes of conflict, we can understand not only why actors contest institutions but also the types of strategies they pursue. Given their particular positions within these shifting dynamics, differen t actors develop distinct institutional strategies, or efforts to reconstruct in· 
Emerging Rivals and Redirection Strategies
The Even quite powerful firms and/or states, however, do not easily prevail over the institutionalized power of already-dominant firms and states. In their redirection strategies, rivals face the problem of institutional depen dence. That is, rivals are dependent as they remain reliant on the existing arrangements even as th ey attempt to redirect them. It was the institutions established by the dominant actors that created opportunities for rivals to emerge. Rivals are thus unlikely to simply replace these institutions. In stead, th ey incrementally reconstitute these institutions to better privilege their preferences. Nowhere is this clearer than in the debate over voting power in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Emerging ri vals like China and India do not seek to dismantle these institutions of US hegemony. Th ey seek to gain greater influence within them and redirect them in their favor. From this view, conflict-driven processes of institu tional change are inevitably incremental as rivals must retool and revise the existing rules.
In his provocative book, Playing Our Game, MIT political scientist Ed ward Steinfeld argues that the ability of Chinese firms and the Chinese state to change the rules of the game to better serve their interests is complicated by the fact that their economic and political power has grown within "a game created and defined by the world's advanced industrial economies, most notably the United States" (2010:24) . China has willingly, or through the stipulations of outside organizations like the WTO, engaged in what Steinfeld calls institutional outsourcing. That is, in order to facilitate its spectacular economic growth, the Chinese state and Chinese firms have im ported a range of institutions from a currency management system to, as we will see, a system of cotton quality classification. Just replicating these in stitutions domestically is a daunting task. It requires that certain practices, technologies, expertise, people, tools, and standards must be transferred from one context to another.
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Adopting a new currency management sys tem, for example, requires not only new technologies but also new forms of formal and tacit knowledge and even new types of bureaucrats. The ability of the Chinese state or Chinese firms to not only replicate but also redirect such institutions to serve their interests is highly uncertain.
From this view, historical institutionalists' attention to path dependen cies of existing institutions is critical, so long as we contextualize them wi thin particular trajectories of institutionalized global capitalist develop ment. Actors construct governance institutions to solve the problems they face given their historically and spatially specific position within processes of accumulation. These institutions then carry with them complex and his torically specific constellations of knowledge/expertise, technology, materi al i ty , discursive legitimations, social roles, and relationships that cannot be cast aside, transplanted elsewhere, or redirected to serve different interests in a simple and straightforward wa y .
Marginalized Actors and Protection Strategi,es
While emerging rivals may pose the greatest threat to the institutional privi leges enjoyed by dominant actors, marginalized actors too advance chal lenges that can be effective. Marginalized actors' bargaining power is un dermined by the destructive dynamics of liberal market projects. Lacking the bargaining power to compete for institutional privileges, these actors pursue protection strategi.es, which seek to reconstruct institutions to mini mize the disadvantages marginalized actors face.
Rachel Schurman and William Munro (2010) demonstrate these dynam ics in their study of struggles between activists and agribusiness firms over the governance of biotechnology. They reveal how agribusiness firms, and particularly the biotech giant Monsanto, sought to piece together a global legal framework to privatize and commodify life forms through the pro tection of intellectual property rights for genetically modified (GM) see ds. Activists from the United States to Zambia, however, saw these institutions as having destructive effects, linking them to a range of issues from the loss of genetic diversity to the intensification of rural poverty and inequality by forcing small farmers to purchase rather than save and replant their seeds. These were not simply struggles over material well-being but also discur sive struggles to define what is fair and just Biotech proponents saw GM seeds as "good technologies" that were profitable and had the potential to feed the world's growing population. Opponents, in contrast, saw Mon santo's aggressive attempts to sell their seeds around the world as evidence of "greed and economic rapaciousness" (2010:189). As such, these activists launched what we might call protection strategies to contest these gover nance arrangements that privileged a small group of corporate elite over th e environment, food security, and farmers around the world.
In this way, we can see how more marginalized players, particularly as they organize together, can be "strategic actors" or "institutional entrepre neurs" who search out loopholes and weak points in existing institutions in order to challenge them, much as institutionalists would suggest However, by understanding these challenges as resistance to the destructive effects of market liberalism, we are able to understand why this contestation occurs, Marginalized actors contest governance institutions that they perceive as threatening their established livelihoods and their ideas about what is fair and just.
Marginalized actors will not necessarily be successful in their attempts to challenge liberal market institutions. Contrary to institutionalist accounts that have difficulty specifying why some actors are more effective than oth ers, situating them within processes of capital accumulation helps us to understand the relative abilities of different players to effectively operate as institutional entrepreneurs. Protection strategies are, by nature, waged by actors who have relatively little power compared with dominant firms and states and who see their rights and resources undermined by liberal market projects. Given the limited bargaining power of marginalized actors, pro tection strategies are only rarely the decisive factor in struggles over institu tions. However, as social movement scholars have demonstrated, the kinds of claims that such movements make and the discursive frames that th ey construct can infl uence the strategies of more powerful firms and states and shape the form that the resulting governance institutions will take (see Smith and Wiest 2012).
Despite the infl uence that protection strategies can wield in struggles over governance institutions, we cannot assume that their strategies will take progressive forms. 
Recent analysts have argued that both the global justice movement and the religious Right in the United States can be seen as reactions to the destructive effects of liberal market projects (see Evans
Dominant Actors and Preservation Strategi.es
It is not only emerging rivals and marginalized actors who seek to reconsti tute the existing institutional structure. Dominant actors, too, play a critical role in spu rring institutional change. This at first seems counterintuitive. Dominan t actors create institutions like quality standards to facilitate trade and refl ect their preferences over those of workers, other marginalized ac tors, and rival firms and states. These actors are thus privileged by the ex isting institutional structure and the organization of the global economy it engenders and would be reticent to change it. However, the challenges from both rival and marginalized actors desta bilize the existing institutional structure and make the enforcement of rules difficult. In this context, even dominant actors are compelled to reconfigure existing arrangements in an effort to protect their institutional privileges. Dominant actors develop preservation strategies that aim to reconstruct in stitutions in ways that both appease challengers and protect their institu tional privileges (cf. Gramsci 1971). These are not strategies to simply deflect challenges and preserve institutions in their existing form. Rather, given the growing bargaining power of rivals and the potential for marginalized actors to disrupt accumulation patterns, dominant actors are compelled to actively reconfigure the institutional structure in an effort to quell these challenges and maintain what institutional privileges they can.
These conflict-driven processes result in institutions that are inevitably hybrid. This is not because challengers are guaranteed success in their ef forts to reconstruct the existing rules but rather because dominant actors' preservation strategies attempt to pacify the challengers by offering some palatable changes. 
States and Geopolitical Competition
The axes of conflict I identify represent conflictual relationships amongpri· vate actors operating in the market. Indeed, these institutional positions (dominant, rival, and marginalized actors) and institutional strategies (pres· ervation, redirection, protection) can be occupied and pursued by private actors. At the same time, however, it is common for private actors to im· plore states to support their strategy and to pursue it on their behalf. Capi · talist firms can -indeed, must-rely on states to create and enforce much States, however, play a dual role, in that they not only shape the in stitutional terrain on which firms compete and more marginalized actors secure a livelihood, but also may emerge as competitors in their own right as they compete with other states to capture mobile capital and/or facili tate the competitiveness of domestic over foreign firms. Many accounts of transnational governance institutions tend to underplay the competitive dy namics among states. Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004) , for example, provides what is in many ways a paradigmatic study of states' efforts to transform their roles in an effort to participate in global economic governance. She argues that government officials disaggregate state sovereignty by building transnational networks with their counterparts around the globe to address common concerns such as the harmonization of regulations and cross border enforcement. While acknowledging that government officials from different countries may have conflicting interests in governance networks, Slaughter insists that they can and do work together effectively by agree ing to "constitutional norms" that ensure "an inclusive, tolerant, respectful, and decentralized world order'' (2004:27,29) . However, by underplaying the competitive dynamics among states, her account leaves us with unan swered questions. For instance, why would branches of "disaggregating states" choose this high-road strategy rather than pursue dominance within new governance institutions? Why would weaker states choose to partici pate if a "high-road" approach is not assured? In short, Slaughter's account overlooks how geopolitical competition shapes the operation and form of network ed governance institutions.
This type of approach is short-sighted because emerging rivals-both firms and states -are not only interested in changing existing rules to serve their interests. They also seek the power that comes from controlling the rules into the future (cf. Strange 1989). Over time, firms' and states' inter ests in what rules prevail can change in relation to their own shifting com petitiveness and due to changes in broader historical circumstances beyond their control. Emerging rivals thus may seek the agenda-setting power that comes from occupying key coordinating roles within institutions. We will see that the Chinese state sought to supplant US control over quality stan dards. It recognized that the US state gained power from creating the physi cal representations of quality standards that all others must use. As Drezner insists, we need to consider "the competition by the economic superpowers to win the standard-setting game" (2005:842) .
State preferences, however, may or may not align neatly with the prefer ences of any particular social group in its territory. While coalitions of states and domestic elites are common, these coalitions are neither automatic nor unproblematic. They can be made difficult both by competing elite class fractions within a state with different interests in what institutional strategy to pursue and by the protection strategies of marginalized actors. Thus, critical to a successful preservation, redirection, or protection strategy is coalition building. Actors must develop tactics to reconstruct the existing institutional arrangements to advance and gain broader support for/acqui escence to their project.
Particularly with the rise of transnational firms who are increasingly un moored from particular state spaces, building a coalition that can success fully restabilize the rules of the game is far from straightforward. Indeed, we will see that transnational cotton merchants, historically aligned with the US state, faced a conundrum given the hegemonic rivalries between the United States and China. While the US state's support for their agenda of private transnational governance could be secured, transnational mer chants were reticent to tie themselves to a sinking ship. In this context, transnational merchants attempted to position their private governance as geographically neutral and thus compatible with either Chinese-or US-led hegemony in the future.
Institutional Change and Hegemonic Rivalries
In sum, I argue that conflict over institutions like quality standards must be understood as constituted by and constitutive of broader struggles over the organization of the global capitalist system. Both challengers and dominant actors attempt to use strategies institutionalists identify in their efforts to transform institutions. Actors draw on, reconstitute, and mix historically specific institutional fragments in the struggle to create and legitimate new rules in their interests. Th ey engage in discursive hrico/age as th ey seek to shape ideas about who can legitimately set rules (e.g., states vs. firms); what kind of rules can be set (e.g., those that facilitate or hamper trade); and how they can be set (e.g., on the basis of scientific findings, or through demo cratic procedures). In short, the d yn amic interplay between institutions and strategic action that institutionalist scholars emphasize remains critical in this account. However, it is only by understanding the underlying conflict that we can understand why institutional change inevitably involves this dynamic interplay and results in hybrid institutions.
Actors' preferences and relative bargaining power in a particular institu tional struggle are shaped by their positions within a broader conflict gener ated by the efforts of dominant firms and states (or hegemonic coalitions) to establish institutions that extend market discipline on a greater scale and in a ge ographical confi gur ation that benefits them. In response, other firms and states (emerging rivals for hegemonic power and weaker actors) at tempt to challenge and redirect these institutions to reconstruct the global capitalist system in their favor. By identifying the underlying causes of con flict and the strategies actors pursue, my approach allows a careful analy sis of the (possible) transition from one hegemonic coalition to another as struggles across a multitude of sectors ultimately instantiate this broader geoeconomic and geopolitical transition.
WHY COTTON?
The struggle over who makes the rules for the global economy is being fought on a myriad of battlegrounds across a wide range of sectors. Yet, cot ton is in many ways an ideal lens through which to explore the d yn amics of institutional change. In the contemporary era, conflict in the cotton trade cuts across critical fault lines in the global economy. Western transnational firms and states face challenges to their position as rule-makers not only from some of the weakest actors in the global economy, such as states and cotton producers in West Africa and their social movement allies, but also from some of the emerging giants, most importantly, China.
But cotton has long been a commodity at the center of historical trans formations in global capitalism. Cotton was one of the most important comm odities linking the industrial revolution in Britain with slavery in the United States and the social, economic, and political devastation that the slave trade wrought on communities in West Africa. In an ironic twist, we see these same nations linked by cotton again, yet this time in a different constellation of social relationships. West African producers now compete with those in the United States on the global market They do not, however, compete as equals. The farms of US producers are much larger (averaging around 1,000 acres) with highly mechanized operations. Their counterparts in West African countries work small plots of land (2-7 acres), which they plant, weed, and harvest by hand. While US producers are known for pro viding reliable supply in great volumes, it is widely agreed that West African producers not only grow cotton at a lower cost ($ With privatization and the liberalization of markets in the 1990s and 2000s, these two sets of cotton producers were drawn into more direct com petition and were increasingly linked to the same powerful middlemen. A handful of transnational merchants were coming to dominate the trade in not just cotton but a diverse portfolio of agricultural commodities. As these merchants competed to construct global sourcing networks and to manage the risks of commodity trade on the futures market, they claimed control over the critical link between geographically dispersed cotton producers and geographically dispersed and relatively small-scale textile manufactur· ers as textile and apparel production shifted from Western Europe to Asia. This position as key middlemen gave them signifi cant power to direct the benefits of trade in their favor.
The growing dominance of transnational firms vis-a-vis states, workers, and agricultural producers in the global economy has itself been deemed a critical shift in historical social relations. But in the early 2000s, the cotton trade became a key battleground for another potential shift: would the bal ance of power in the global economy shift increasingly to Asia, and particu larly to China? The phase-out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) from 1995 to 2005 liberalized trade in apparel and, paired with the accession of China to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, shifted the geogra phy of apparel and textile production. China burst on the scene as the larg est producer of textiles and apparel-and the largest importer of cotton-in the world. For China, cotton was a critical commodity that linked the fate of its agricultural producers with the competitiveness of its textile and apparel firms, the foreign exchange that they earned, and the millions of workers that they employed. Approximately 20 million people are directly involved in the textile sector in China, and apparel and textiles accounted for 15 per cent of China's total export value in 2005 (Alpermann 2010; FAS 2006) . More than a hundred million farmers and farmworkers are involved in the production of cotton in China (Alpermann 2010).
As these policy shifts augmented the economic power of China, they also gave new teeth to the crisis of Western legitimacy in the cotton trade. These policy shifts consolidated the power of three key actors: the Chinese state, the US state, and transnational cotton merchants. As of 2012, none of these actors has been capable of setting new rules of the game. Rather, the first decade of the twenty-first century was a period in which the Chinese state, the US state, and transnational merchants were competing over who could claim authority in the global cotton trade. That is, they competed over who could translate their economic power into legitimate and enforceable insti tutional rules.
The contemporary cotton trade lets us explore two stories that are critical to understanding both the crisis of Western legitimacy and emerging forms of transnational cooperation for economic governance. First is the story of weaker actors-in this case, cotton producers, small merchants/ginners, and states in West African countries (and other cotton-producing countries around the globe)-who are challenging the Western liberal market project that again subordinates them, albeit in new ways, in the global economy. The second story is of increasingly powerful actors, such as the Chinese state and Chinese textile manufacturers, who aspire to set their own rules for global trade. Perhaps most interesting is how the two stories intertwine. Together, these stories allow us to explore how the growing power of trans national corporations, and their allies in Western states, is upset by shift ing geopolitical dynamics. And they allow us to consider what this means for the construction of new transnational governance institutions and the ability of weaker actors to have their voices heard in these negotiations. In essence, these stories reveal the diverse axes of conflict and institutional strategi es-redirection, protection, and preservation-that are generated by liberal market projects, and the hybrid institutions that result.
WHY Q.UALITY STANDARDS?
It is this varied group of firms and states in cotton-producin g and -importing countries, as well as an amalgam of scientists, arbitrators, and trade asso ciation representati ves, who negotiate economic governance in the cotton trade. And it is within these broader shifts in the power dynamics among 28 CHAPTER ONE them that I explore negotiations over a k ey economic governance institu tion: quality standards, and the mechanisms to settle disputes over quality. Admittedly, at first glance, quality standards seem to be a terribly mundane, technical issue that should hardly demand our attention. The reality, how ever, is quite the opposite (see Busch 2000).
Economic sociologist Jens Beckert ( Benchmark standards are physical representations of the "true" value of the different grades or categories. This is considered a critical coordinating function as it is subject to considerable manipulation and serves as the basis for classification and dispute settlement. When cotton is classed for sale on the market, it is compared with these benchmark standards to determine its quality and price. The final task is dispute settlement. If a merchant ships cotton from Benin to China and the Chinese buyer argues that the cotton delivered was not what she ordered, who will settle the dispute, authori tatively determine the quality of the cotton, and enforce this definition? Historically, the settlement of quality disputes has been intrinsically linked with the governance of contracts more broadly and thus rules for "quality terms" in a contract have often been elaborated in conjunction with rules for "technical terms," such as who will be responsible for storage, transpor tation, and insurance or how payment will be made.
These tasks for the governance of quality standards must be conducted regardless of whether trade in cotton occurs within a face-to-face market or clear acro ss the globe. However, these tasks and the social relationships that th ey embody can take distinct form in different locations, at different historical moments, and in relation to the changing economic organiza tion of trade. As we will see in the subsequent chapters, these three gover nance tasks have also been the key axes of struggle over quality standards th ro ughout history. I co n sider negotiations over these governance tasks from 1970 to 2012 in comparison with a sinillar struggle over quality standards that occurred from 1870 to the 1920s. As we will see, negotiations over these forms of economic governance are conflictual because who makes the rules matters. Whoever can successfully claim authority over quality standards has con siderable influence over how the benefi ts of trade are distributed. As Tim Biithe and Walter Mattli explain, struggles over standards matter for firms and states as "to lose may mean higher production costs, steeper costs of switching to international standards, lower international competitiveness, loss of export markets, and even risk of corporate demise" (2on:ll), And for weaker actors, such as small farmers in West Africa, to lose may mean greater livelihood instability-greater difficulty sending one's children to school and putting food on the table. This question reflects what continues to be a deeply embedded meth odological nationalism in social scientific research -that is, our tenden cy to frame research, even research on transnational processes, in nation-state centric terms. This is not to say that nation-states are no longer pertin ent to study. Indeed, the chapters of this book will repeatedly refer to state s and state agencies and their roles in transnational governance. Overcomi ng methodological nationalism means not seeing nation-states as contain ers for social activities.
To move beyond methodological nationalism in the study of trans national processes, we need to demarcate transnational space as ou r area of focus. To this end, I used the global commodity chain (GCC) a pproach as a methodological tool to track actors that are at once linked in the global cotton trade and embedded in place-specific constellations oflabor, technol ogy, materiality, science, culture, and discourse (see Collins 200;; Gereffi 1994). Hopkins and Wallerstein (1977, 1986 ) first introduced the concept of the co mmodity chain as an alternative to the methodological nationalism that characterized much research at that time. The commodity chain is de fined as "a network oflabor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity'' (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986:159). The commodity chain represents a useful analytical tool to study global standard-setting by helping one trace the relationships among diverse actors involved in the sector for which the standards are being made. As Jane Collins explains, commodity chains can help one " gr asp the evolving organizational aspects of international trade, the linkages that animate it, the coordination that makes it possible and the new global bodies that regulate it'' (2005:4).
In r= wi th a range of other actors, such as states, lawyers, and scientists, who also intervene in standard-setting processes. To capture these actors, I fur ther interviewed government officials, fiber scientists, lawyers, arbitrators, and various firms that provide services to the cotton trade (e.g., inspection firms, shipping firms, insurance firms). This research strategy was critical not only for capturing institutional change over time through cross-time comparisons but also for capturing di verse axes of conflict. I was able to examine divergent interests in standard setting between actors at more dominant or powerful nodes of the com modity chain, such as transnational cotton merchants, and those in more marginalized nodes, such as cotton producers. It allowed me to trace the patterns of social conflict between actors within the same node, such as between cotton producers in the United States versus those in West African countries. And finally, it oriented me toward struggles between powerful firms and states, in both competitive and client-based relationships, such as the struggle between Chinese textile manufacturers and transnational merchants and between the US and Chinese states.
OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
The chapters of the book explore struggles over quality standards in the global cotton trade. As I trace these struggles, I aim to demonstrate how contestation over specifi c institutions, such as cotton quality standards, must be understood as constituted by and constitutive of broader conflicts in the organization of the global capitalist system. Actors' preferences, bar gaining power, and institutional strategies in these struggles reflect their position within the dynamics of global capitalist development unleashed by liberal market projects. And these conflict-driven institutional strategies generate new, hy brid institutions.
Chapter 2 begins the analysis by turning to an earlier period of globaliza tion from the 1870s to the 1920s. This chapter demonstrates how episodes of institutio nal change are best understood when situated within broader materi al and discursive struggles over the organization of the global capital ist system. Merchants from Liverpool constructed their private authority over quality standards and dispute settlement as part of a broader project of British-led market liberalism in the 1870s. While this liberal market proj ect remade the cotton trade in its image to a significant degree, it also un leashe d the creative and destructive dynamics of capitalism and generated both new rivals and marginalized actors, particularly in the United States, who sought to challenge these governance institutions. These challenges brought a conflict-driven process of institutional change. Rivals such as the US state remained dependent on the Liverpool standards and thus needed to master the existing standards before pursuing a redirection strategy to recast them to refl ect their preferences. This institutional dependence en sured that the process of institutional change unfolded incrementally. As challenges to the Liverpool standards grew in intensity, Liverpool mer chants were compelled to pursue a preservation strategy to reconstitute the rules in ways that would appease challengers while retaining their insti tutional privileges. The resulting institutions were thus hybrid in nature as the product of the iterative and competitive reconstitution of the rules. Ultimately, the broader shift in the balance of economic and political power toward the United States aided the US state in securing control over quality standards, if in a hybrid governance arrangement that integrated Liverpool merchants in an oversight role. The United States replaced private standards for economic liberalism with national standards for embedded liberalism that nonethdess preserved private authority over dispute settlement. In sum, institutional change was a process shaped by path dependencies, strategic efforts on the part of actors, and their embeddedness in broader, historically specific processes of capital accumulation on a world scale.
In chapter 3, I turn to the contemporary struggle over quality standards. This chapter demonstrates that projects to create new institutions are of ten trial-and-error, ad hoc efforts, as institutionalist scholars suggest, but they are also driven by competitive efforts to shape the terrain of market competition. Actors create new institutions to solve the problems they face given their historically and spatially specific position within patterns of capital accumulation. The chapter begins by tracing the rise of a US-led liberal market project in the 1970s and the efforts of the US state and tranS· national merchants to recast quality standards and dispute settlement to privilege their preferences in this liberalizing environment. As the textil e and apparel trade became increasingly global, a new US cotton classifica tion system became the de facto global system. However, it was also met with skepticism given the patterns of conflict that emerged in respons e to the United States' liberal market project. The United States' project was seen as a highly uneven liberalization project that required countries in the global South to liberalize markets while the United States continued to protect its textile and cotton producers from market discipline. At the same time, US and European merchants took advantage of market liberalization to extend their cotton supply and distribution networks, as well as their private authority over dispute settlement, on a global scale. Yet, while trans· national merchants gained greater power to impose the rules of the game, they also faced limits to the enforceability of their preferred rules. Particu larly in a context of growing inequality between trade partners, merchants' private authority over dispute settlement was contingent on the support of states and a transformation in states' organizing logics to serve transna tional firms rather than domestic cotton producers or textile manufacturers. In this chapter, we see how actors searched for institutional arrangements that solved par ticular problems or helped them pursue new opportunities given their particular positions within the US liberal market project. At the same time, the efficacy of these institutions was limited by the patterns of conflict that th ey generated.
Chapter 4 In c hapter 5, I demonstrate why we should expect conflict-driven pro cess es of institution al change to inevitably be incremental in nature. Emerg ing rivals re main dependent on existing arrangements even as they pursue redirection strategies to reconstitute them in their favor. China emerged as a powerful rival in part due to the United States' liberal market project and the institutions-from quality standards to the wro-that facilitated it. Yet, in its redirection strategy to retool existing rules, the Chinese state found itself dependent not only on aspects of the existing standards and dispute settlement rules but also on the broader institutional framework at the WTO that shaped how rules could be made. This institutional de pendence made the Chinese state's redirection strategy necessarily focused on incremental changes as it first had to master the existing arrangements before trying to introduce changes. Thus, through its redirection strategy, the Chinese state sought to import and imitate institutional forms from the United States as a way to solve the problems of institutional dependence and institutional incongruities and ultimately overtake these institutions.
Chapter 6 reveals why conflict-driven processes of institutional chang e result in new arrangements that are inevitably hybrid. Facing challenges from both rival and marginalized actors, dominant actors are compelled to retool institutional arrangements in an effort to preserve their institutional privileges and stabilize existing rules. Indeed, we see that the USDA and transnational merchants launched preservation strategies that aimed to re constitute the institutional arrangements in ways that would both appeas e challengers and maintain their institutional privileges. Institutional chang e thus results in hybrid arrangements as even dominant actors participate in the reconstruction of rules and contribute to a process of track-swit ching, or the redirecting of these institutions along a new path-dependent trajectory, Finally,the concluding chapter discusses the implications of this analysis of shifting quality standards and dispute settlement mechanisms for broader debates in the literatures on institutional change and the governance of the global economy. Drawing on comparisons with the historical standards war at the tum of the twentieth century and with other cases of Chines e standard-setting, this chapter demonstrates that specific instances of insti tutional change must be understood as constituted by and constituti ve of broader transformations in the organization of the global capitalist system, Conflicts over the rules of the game in the cotton trade can be understo od as reflecting and instantiating the shift from a British-led to a US-led hege monic coalition, as well as the potential rise of a new hegemonic coalition in which both China and transnational firms are likely to play promine nt roles. A theory of institutional change in the global capitalist system thu s sheds light on the broader competitive dynamics and power relations that shape who will set the rules of the game into the future.
